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In this paper, we revisit the eﬀects of government spending shocks on private con-
sumption within an estimated New-Keynesian DSGE model of the euro area featuring
non-Ricardian households. Employing Bayesian inference methods, we show that the
presence of non-Ricardian households is in general conducive to raising the level of con-
sumption in response to government spending shocks when compared with the bench-
mark speciﬁcation without non-Ricardian households. However, we ﬁnd that there is
only a fairly small chance that government spending shocks crowd in consumption,
mainly because the estimated share of non-Ricardian households is relatively low, but
also due to the large negative wealth eﬀect induced by the highly persistent nature of
government spending shocks.
JEL Classiﬁcation System: E32, E62
Keywords: non-Ricardian households, ﬁscal policy, DSGE modelling, euro area
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Micro-founded models of optimising agents are essential for evaluating the consequences
of alternative macroeconomic policies. As to the analysis of ﬁscal policy, it has long been
recognised that the introduction of non-Ricardian elements in these models play a crucial
role in obtaining meaningful results. Thus, a large body of literature has been oriented
towards gauging the implications of diﬀerent forms of heterogeneity across households that
permit to evade Ricardian equivalence.
Recent research on the transmission of ﬁscal policy in New-Keynesian dynamic general
equilibrium (DSGE) models has introduced heterogeneity across households by assuming
that some households follow a simple rule of thumb and simply consume their after-tax
disposable income in each period (see, e.g., Gal´ ı, L´ opez-Salido and Vall´ es, 2004). As a
result of such non-Ricardian behaviour, transfer policies have real eﬀects and the possibility
arises that a rise in government spending may crowd in private consumption, as suggested
by the empirical literature (see, e.g., Perotti, 2002; Fat´ as and Mihov, 2001; Canzoneri,
Cumby and Diba, 2002; and Mountford and Uhlig, 2001).
In this paper, we revisit the eﬀects of government spending shocks on consumption util-
ising an extended version of the estimated euro area model by Smets and Wouters (2003).
This model supplements the standard New-Keynesian DSGE model with sticky prices by
adding sticky wages and various types of real frictions in an attempt to capture the high
degree of persistence characterising macroeconomic time series. In our extended version
of this model we allow, like Gal´ ı et al. (2004), for the co-existence of non-Ricardian and
Ricardian households. In addition, we allow for a more detailed ﬁscal policy framework
with a ﬁscal policy rule in place that stabilises the evolution of government debt and with
diﬀerent types of distortionary taxes as well as lump-sum transfers. Adopting the empir-
ical approach used by Smets and Wouters, we ﬁrst employ Bayesian estimation methods
to determine the relative importance of non-Ricardian households in the euro area under
diﬀerent assumptions regarding the ﬁscal policy framework. We then proceed to analyse the
inﬂuences of non-Ricardian households and ﬁscal policy on the equilibrium dynamics of the
estimated model. In particular, we investigate the role played by non-Ricardian households
in the propagation of government spending and monetary policy shocks and in accounting
for observed ﬂuctuations in consumption.
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area is relatively small, suggesting that ﬁnancial deregulation over the last two decades
has lowered ﬁnancial-market participation costs and lending support to the observation
that the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy have become weaker over time (see, e.g., Fat´ as and Mihov,
2001; and Perotti, 2002). At the same time, we ﬁnd that the inclusion of non-Ricardian
households in our model has important consequences for the estimation of the preference
parameters inﬂuencing the intertemporal consumption choices of Ricardian households. In
particular, the Ricardian households’ willingness to smooth consumption is found to be
lower than in the benchmark speciﬁcation without non-Ricardian households. This, at least
partially, oﬀsets the positive impact that non-Ricardian households exert on consumption
in response to government spending shocks. Nevertheless, we show that, when compared
with the benchmark speciﬁcation, the inclusion of non-Ricardian households is in general
conducive to raising the level of consumption in response to a government spending shock,
notably in an environment where the tax burden largely rests with Ricardian households.
As a practical matter, however, we ﬁnd that there is only a fairly small chance that a
government spending shock crowds in consumption, mainly because the estimated share
of non-Ricardian agents is relatively low, but also due to the large negative wealth eﬀect
induced by the highly persistent nature of government spending shocks.
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Recent years have witnessed the development of a new generation of New-Keynesian
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models that build on explicit microfoun-
dations with optimising agents. Major advances in estimation methodology allowed esti-
mating variants of these models that are able to compete with more standard time-series
models, such as vector autoregressions. Accordingly, the new generation of microfounded
DSGE models provides a framework that appears particularly suited for evaluating the
consequences of alternative macroeconomic policies.
While the literature has largely focused on using variants of the New-Keynesian DSGE
model to analyse the consequences of monetary policy, we are interested in elucidating
the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy within such framework. Speciﬁcally, we focus on the eﬀects of
government spending shocks on private consumption—an issue which has been at centre
stage of the policy debate for quite a long time. Standard versions of the New-Keynesian
DSGE model typically predict a strong negative response of consumption to government
spending shocks, while the empirical literature suggests that such shocks have a positive or,
at least, no signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on consumption (see, e.g., Perotti, 2002; Fat´ as and
Mihov, 2001; Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba, 2002; Mountford and Uhlig, 2001; and Gal´ ı,
L´ opez-Salido and Vall´ es, 2004). Clearly, in order to provide reliable policy advice, it is of
key importance to ascertain to which extent models used for quantitative policy analysis
can be reconciled with this established feature of the data.
The main reason for the failure of standard DSGE models to predict a positive consump-
tion response to government spending shocks has already been identiﬁed in a much simpler
Real Business Cycle (RBC) framework by Baxter and King (1993). As the authors show,
government spending shocks (ﬁnanced by lump-sum taxes) generate a negative wealth eﬀect
which induces households to work more but to consume less. Following the earlier analysis
by Baxter and King, there have been several attempts in the recent literature to resolve
the apparent consumption puzzle. Linnemann and Schabert (2003), for example, analyse
the eﬀects of government spending shocks in a standard New-Keynesian sticky-price model.
The idea of introducing imperfect competition together with sticky prices into the RBC
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an aggregate demand externality according to which an increase in output leads to a rise
in proﬁts and income. Higher proﬁts and income in turn may help to oﬀset the negative
wealth eﬀect. Second, sticky prices raise the possibility that labour demand reacts stronger
than labour supply, with real wages increasing alongside labour supply. However, as shown
by Linnemann and Schabert, in the standard New-Keynesian model a positive consumption
response can only arise if monetary policy is suﬃciently accommodative. Even a modestly
aggressive monetary policy rule implies a sharp decline in consumption after a government
spending shock because the households’ consumption choice is still dominated by the neg-
ative wealth eﬀect. Thus, any successful attempt to resolve the consumption puzzle must
aim at dampening the dominant role of the latter.
In the standard New-Keynesian model, the negative wealth eﬀect is ampliﬁed by the
fact that all households are forward looking and able to smooth consumption by trading in
physical and/or ﬁnancial assets. As a consequence, consumption is a function of permanent
rather than current disposable income and “Ricardian equivalence” holds. However, there
is growing scepticism whether such framework represents a good approximation to reality.
Empirically, consumption seems to track current income more closely than predicted by
standard representative-agent models (see, e.g., Hall, 1978; and Campbell and Mankiw,
1989). In the light of this observation, Mankiw (2000) has emphasised the need to build a
new type of model for analysing the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy shocks. Such type of model should
allow for heterogeneity of a particular form: some households should act in an optimising,
fully forward-looking manner, while others ought to follow a simple rule of thumb that
renders consumption smoothing impossible. Mankiw argues that such form of heterogeneity
can be easily reconciled with stylised facts at both the micro and macro level. First, by
reviewing micro studies on the consumption pattern of households in the United States,
Mankiw provides evidence supporting the view that consumption tracks current income
far more than it should. Evidently, there are many reasons why consumption smoothing
is far from perfect, amongst which the existence of borrowing and/or liquidity constraints,
myopia on the part of households and very high discounting are obvious candidates. Second,
based on the shape of the wealth and income distributions in the United States, Mankiw
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means to smooth consumption.
On the basis of this evidence, Gal´ ı, L´ opez-Salido and Vall´ es (2004) have extended
the standard New-Keynesian sticky-price model by allowing for the co-existence of
“non-Ricardian” and “Ricardian” households, with the former following a rule-of-thumb
and simply consuming their after-tax disposable income each period and the latter optimis-
ing in a forward-looking manner and thereby smoothing consumption over time. Gal´ ıe ta l .
demonstrate how the interaction of the two types of households with ﬁrms that infrequently
adjust prices and a ﬁscal authority which issues debt to ﬁnance part of its expenditure can
account for the existing evidence on the eﬀects of government spending shocks. Notwith-
standing, the quantitative impact of a government spending shock on consumption largely
depends on the degree of debt ﬁnancing and on whether the real wage increases or decreases
on impact. As a consequence, the response pattern of consumption is highly dependent on
the form of the ﬁscal policy rule and on how the real wage is determined in the labour mar-
ket. Regarding the latter, Gal´ ı et al. assume the existence of a generalised wage schedule
according to which households are willing to meet ﬁrms’ demand for labour at the real wage
oﬀered. This assumption allows generating a sharp increase in the real wage after a gov-
ernment spending shock which in turn helps to oﬀset the negative wealth eﬀect. However,
as argued in Bilbiie and Straub (2004a), such sharp increase is at odds with the observed
a-cyclical behaviour of the real wage. Indeed, since standard RBC models predict strongly
pro-cyclical movements in the real wage, shocks to government spending have naturally
been thought of as an additional source of ﬂuctuations that could help reduce the predicted
strong pro-cyclical pattern (see, e.g., Christiano and Eichenbaum, 1992). Moreover, the
real-wage response to government spending shocks tends to be small empirically (see, e.g.,
Fat´ as and Mihov, 2001).
In the light of this discussion, we revisit the eﬀects of government spending shocks
on consumption utilising an extended version of the estimated euro area model by Smets
and Wouters (2003). This model supplements the standard New-Keynesian DSGE model
with sticky prices by adding sticky wages and various types of real frictions in an attempt
to capture the high degree of persistence characterising macroeconomic time series. In
9
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Ricardian and Ricardian households. In addition, we allow for a more detailed ﬁscal policy
framework with a ﬁscal policy rule in place that stabilises the evolution of government
debt and with diﬀerent types of distortionary taxes as well as lump-sum taxes/transfers.
Adopting the empirical approach used by Smets and Wouters, we ﬁrst employ Bayesian
estimation methods to determine the relative importance of non-Ricardian households in
the euro area under diﬀerent assumptions regarding the ﬁscal policy framework. We then
proceed to analyse the inﬂuences of non-Ricardian households and ﬁscal policy on the
equilibrium dynamics of the estimated model. In particular, we investigate the role played
by non-Ricardian households in the propagation of government spending and monetary
policy shocks and in accounting for observed ﬂuctuations in consumption.
Our results indicate that the estimated share of non-Ricardian households in the euro
area is relatively small, suggesting that ﬁnancial deregulation over the last two decades
has lowered ﬁnancial-market participation costs and lending support to the observation
that the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy have become weaker over time (see, e.g., Fat´ as and Mihov,
2001; and Perotti, 2002). At the same time, we ﬁnd that the inclusion of non-Ricardian
households in our model has important consequences for the estimation of the preference
parameters inﬂuencing the intertemporal consumption choices of Ricardian households. In
particular, the Ricardian households’ willingness to smooth consumption is found to be
lower than in the benchmark speciﬁcation without non-Ricardian households. This, at least
partially, oﬀsets the positive impact that non-Ricardian households exert on consumption
in response to government spending shocks. Nevertheless, we show that, when compared
with the benchmark speciﬁcation, the inclusion of non-Ricardian households is in general
conducive to raising the level of consumption in response to a government spending shock,
notably in an environment where the tax burden largely rests with Ricardian households.
As a practical matter, however, we ﬁnd that there is only a fairly small chance that a
government spending shock crowds in consumption, mainly because the estimated share
of non-Ricardian agents is relatively low, but also due to the large negative wealth eﬀect
induced by the highly persistent nature of government spending shocks. In contrast to
the calibrated model used by Gal´ ı et al., we observe that our estimated model does not
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eﬀect. Finally, we document that reasonable variations in the parameters of the estimated
model have no qualitative impact on our ﬁndings.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines our extended
version of the Smets-Wouters (2003) model featuring non-Ricardian households. Section 3
brieﬂy describes our empirical approach to estimating the extended model and documents
the estimation results. Section 4 investigates the importance of non-Ricardian households
for shaping the propagation of government spending and monetary policy shocks and for
explaining ﬂuctuations in consumption. Section 5 reports the results of additional sensitivity
analysis, and Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
Our model is an extended version of the medium-scale New-Keynesian DSGE model of the
euro area developed by Smets and Wouters (2003), henceforth referred to as SW (2003).
This model features four types of economic agents: households, ﬁrms, a monetary authority
and a ﬁscal authority, the latter being completely passive though. In our extended version,
we allow for two diﬀerent types of households: optimising households, who can trade in
asset markets and thus are able to smooth consumption, and liquidity constrained house-
holds, who cannot participate in asset markets and therefore just consume their after-tax
disposable income. We also allow for a richer ﬁscal policy framework with a ﬁscal policy
rule stabilising the ﬁscal authority’s intertemporal budget and with distortionary taxes as
well as lump-sum taxes/transfers. In the following we brieﬂy outline the behaviours of the
diﬀerent types of agents.
2.1 Households
There is a continuum of households indexed by h ∈ [0,1]. Ashare1−ω of this continuum
of households—referred to as Ricardian households and indexed by i ∈ [0,1 − ω )—have
access to ﬁnancial markets, where they buy and sell government bonds, and accumulate
physical capital, the services of which they rent out to ﬁrms. The remaining share ω of
households—referred to as non-Ricardian households and indexed by j ∈ [1−ω,1]—donot
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the households supply diﬀerentiated labour services to a continuum of unions within the
household sector—indexed over the same range as the households, h ∈ [0,1]—which act as
wage setters in monopolistically competitive markets. The unions pool the wage income of
all households and then distribute the aggregate wage income in equal proportions amongst
the latter. Formally, this may be justiﬁed by the existence of state-contingent securities that
are traded amongst unions in order to insure households against variations in household-
speciﬁc wage income. The households, in turn, are assumed to supply suﬃcient labour
services to satisfy labour demand.
2.1.1 Ricardian Households
Each Ricardian household i maximises its lifetime utility by choosing consumption, Ci,t,
investment, Ii,t, next period’s ﬁnancial wealth in form of one-period government bonds,
Bi,t+1, next period’s physical capital stock, Ki,t+1, and the intensity with which the installed





















Here, β is the discount factor, ς denotes the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion and ζ is
the inverse of the elasticity of work eﬀort with respect to the real wage. The parameter ϑ
measures the degree of external habit formation in consumption. Thus, the household’s
utility depends positively on the diﬀerence between the current, individually chosen level
of consumption, Ci,t, and the average consumption level that was chosen in the previous
period by the Ricardian peer group, C∗
i,t−1, and negatively on labour supply, Ni,t.2 Two
serially correlated shocks enter the utility function: εb
t = ρb εb
t−1 + ηb
t is a preference shock
that aﬀects the Ricardian household’s willingness to smooth consumption over time, and
εn
t = ρn εn
t−1 + ηn
t represents a shock to labour supply.
1While the notion of non-Ricardian behaviour typically refers to the misperception on the part of agents
that a reduction in current taxes ﬁnanced by a rise in government debt (i.e., by higher future tax liabilities)
represents an increase in wealth, we follow the convention in the literature and label those households that
do not trade in assets and simply consume their disposable income as non-Ricardian. Alternatively, Erceg,
Guerrieri and Gust (2003) refer to hand-to-mouth households in this context.
2The pooling of wage income ensures that the marginal utility of wealth out of wage income is identical
across Ricardian households. As a result, Ci,t = C
∗
i,t holds in equilibrium.
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where the terms on the left-hand side show how the household uses its resources, while the
terms on the right-hand side indicate the resources the household has at its disposal. Rt
denotes the risk-less return on government bonds, and Pt is the aggregate price level. The
function Ψ(·) represents the cost of varying the intensity of capital utilisation. RK
t indicates
the rental rate for the capital services rent out to ﬁrms, Zi,t Ki,t,a n dDi,t are the dividends
paid by household-owned ﬁrms. The ﬁscal authority absorbs part of the gross income of
the household to ﬁnance government expenditure. τw is the pay-roll tax rate levied on the
household’s pooled wage income, Wt Nt, while τd denotes the income tax rate levied on all
sources of income (except for the returns on government bonds and minus physical capital
depreciation), and τc is the consumption tax rate.3 Ti,t indicates lump-sum taxes paid (or
transfers received).
The capital stock owned by the Ricardian household evolves according to the following
capital accumulation equation,
Ki,t+1 =( 1 − δ)Ki,t − (1 − Υ(εi
tIi,t/Ii,t−1))Ii,t, (3)
where δ is the time-invariant depreciation rate, Υ(·) represents a generalised adjustment
cost function in investment, and εi
t = ρi εi
t−1 + ηi
t is a serially correlated shock aﬀecting
investment adjustment cost.
Letting Λt and Λt Qt denote the Lagrange multipliers associated with the budget con-
straint (2) and the capital accumulation equation (3), respectively, the ﬁrst-order conditions
for maximising the household’s lifetime utility function (1) with respect to Ci,t, Ii,t, Bi,t+1,
Ki,t+1 and Zi,t are given—in that order—by:
(1 + τc)Λ t = εb
t (Ci,t − ϑC∗
i,t−1)−ς, (4)
3For simplicity, we assume that pay-roll taxes are paid by households alone. Similarly, it is assumed that
dividends are taxed at the household level.
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=Ψ  (Zi,t), (8)
where the latter condition implies that the intensity of capital utilisation is identical across
households; that is, Zi,t = Zt.
Following SW (2003), we have augmented equation (7), which determines the value of
installed capital (that is, Tobin’s Q), with a serially uncorrelated shock η
q
t. This shock is
meant to capture stochastic variation in the external ﬁnance premium.4
2.1.2 Non-Ricardian Households
In our framework, the non-Ricardian households do not optimise—neither intertemporally
nor intratemporally. Each Ricardian household j simply follows a rule of thumb and sets
nominal consumption expenditure equal to after-tax disposable wage income:









Like for the Ricardian households, it is assumed that the non-Ricardian households take
the pooled wage income as given and supply suﬃcient labour services to satisfy labour
demand.
2.1.3 Wage Setting
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive unions within the household sector
indexed by h ∈ [0,1], which act as wage setters for the diﬀerentiated labour services
4While this way of capturing stochastic variation in the external ﬁnance premium is largely ad hoc, it
could be justiﬁed on deeper grounds by introducing stochastic ﬁnancial intermediation costs which would
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aggregate labour demand, Nt,a sg i v e n .
Following Calvo (1983), unions receive permission to optimally reset their nominal wage
rate in a given period t with probability 1 − ξw. All unions that receive permission to
reset their wage rate choose the same wage rate W∗
h,t. Those unions that do not receive








where the parameter γw measures the degree of indexation to past changes in the aggregate
price index Pt.
Each union h that receives permission to optimally reset its wage rate in period t is
assumed to maximise household lifetime utility, as represented by equation (1), taking into
account the wage-indexation scheme (10) and the demand for labour services of variety h,









where the stochastic parameter λw,t = λw+ηw
t determines the wage markup in the unionised
labour markets.5
Hence, we obtain the following ﬁrst-order condition for the union’s optimal wage-setting























Aggregate labour demand, Nt, and the aggregate nominal wage rate, Wt, are determined
5In the log-linear version of the model, the serially uncorrelated wage markup shock η
w
t can be interpreted
as a cost-push shock to wage inﬂation.
6Alternatively, we could distinguish two groups of unions that act in the interest of either Ricardian or
non-Ricardian households. In this case, the unions would choose diﬀerent wage rates, reﬂecting the diﬀerent
consumption patterns of the two types of households. As a practical matter, however, the diﬀerences in wage
rates ought to be limited because our estimation results suggest that both the degree of wage stickiness, ξw,
and the degree of indexation, γw, are relatively high.
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With the union-speciﬁc wage rates Wh,t set according to equation (10) and equation (12),






















0 Xh,t dh =( 1−ω)Xi,t+ωX j,t, as households in each of the two groups are identical.
Hence, aggregate consumption is given by
Ct =( 1 − ω)Ci,t + ωC j,t, (16)
while aggregate hours worked are given by
Nt =( 1 − ω)Ni,t + ωN j,t (17)
with the labour-market equilibrium being characterised by Nt = Ni,t = Nj,t.7
Since only Ricardian households hold ﬁnancial assets, we obtain the following condition
for aggregate holdings of bonds:
Bt+1 =( 1 − ω)Bi,t+1. (18)
Similarly, only Ricardian households accumulate physical capital,
Kt+1 =( 1 − ω)Ki,t+1, (19)
It =( 1 − ω)Ii,t, (20)
7This is a consequence of the assumption that unions pool the wage income of both groups of households.
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Dt =( 1 − ω)Di,t. (21)
Finally, aggregate lump-sum taxes/transfers are given by
Tt =( 1 − ω)Ti,t + ωT j,t. (22)
2.2 Firms
There are two types of ﬁrms. A continuum of monopolistically competitive ﬁrms indexed
by f ∈ [0,1], each of which produces a single diﬀerentiated intermediate good, Yf,t,a n da
distinct set of perfectly competitive ﬁrms, which combine all the intermediate goods into a
single ﬁnal good, Yt.
2.2.1 Final-Good Firms












where the stochastic parameter λp,t = λp + η
p
t determines the price markup in the
intermediate-goods markets.8
Minimising the cost of production subject to the aggregation constraint (23) results in
demands for the diﬀerentiated intermediate goods as a function of their price Pf,t relative




















8In the log-linear version of the model, the serially uncorrelated price markup shock η
p
t can be interpreted
as a cost-push shock to price inﬂation.
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Each intermediate-goods ﬁrm f produces its diﬀerentiated output using an increasing-
returns-to-scale technology,






f,t − Φ, 0

, (26)
utilising as inputs homogenous capital services rent from the households in a centralised
market, ˜ Kf,t = Zt Kf,t, and an index of diﬀerentiated labour services, Nf,t. The variable
εa
t = ρa εa
t−1 + ηa
t is a serially correlated technology shock, and the parameter Φ represents
ﬁxed cost of production.
9
Taking the rental cost of capital, RK
t , and the aggregate wage index, Wt,a sg i v e n ,c o s t
minimisation subject to the production technology (26) yields ﬁrst-order conditions for the




















Following Calvo (1983), intermediate-goods producing ﬁrms receive permission to optimally
reset their price in a given period t with probability 1−ξp. All ﬁrms that receive permission
to reset their price choose the same price P∗
f,t. Those ﬁrms which do not receive permission







where the parameter γp measures the degree of indexation to past changes in the aggregate
price index Pt.
Each ﬁrm f receiving permission to optimally reset its price in period t maximises the








9The ﬁxed cost of production will be chosen to ensure zero proﬁts in steady state. This in turn guarantees
that there is no incentive for other ﬁrms to enter the market in the long run.
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is the stochastic discount factor of the households owning the ﬁrm and
Df,t = Pf,tYf,t − MCt(Yf,t + Φ) (31)
are period-t nominal proﬁts which are distributed as dividends to the households.
Hence, we obtain the following ﬁrst-order condition for the ﬁrm’s optimal price-setting













− (1 + λp,t+k)MCt+k

=0 . (32)
With the intermediate-goods prices Pf,t set according to equation (29) and equation (32),

















2.3 Fiscal and Monetary Authorities
The ﬁscal authority purchases the ﬁnal good, Gt, issues bonds, Bt+1, and raises taxes
with details on the latter being given in Section 2.1 above. The ﬁscal authority’s budget
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where all quantities are expressed in real per-capita terms.
Since our model features non-Ricardian households, the time paths of government debt
and taxes matter for the evolution of the economy. To select amongst the set of feasible
time paths, and to stabilise government debt, we choose, as in Gal´ ı et al. (2004), a simple
log-linear ﬁscal policy rule:
tt = φb bt + φg gt, (35)
where φb and φg are the elasticities of lump-sum taxes with respect to government debt and
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of lump-sum taxes, government debt and government spending, respectively.10
Here, government spending is assumed to evolve exogenously according to a serially
correlated process,





t represents a serially uncorrelated shock.
As in SW (2003), the monetary authority sets the nominal interest rate according to a
simple log-linear monetary policy rule,
rt = φr rt−1 +( 1− φr)( ¯ πt + φπ (πt−1 − ¯ πt)+φy (yt − y∗
t)) (37)
+φ∆π (πt − πt−1)+φ∆y (yt − y∗
t − (yt−1 − y∗
t−1)) + ηr
t,
where rt = log(Rt/R) is the log-deviation of the nominal interest rate from its steady-
state value and πt = log(Pt/Pt−1) denotes the quarter-on-quarter inﬂation rate. yt is the
logarithm of aggregate output, while y∗
t is the logarithm of the aggregate output level that
would prevail if wages and prices were ﬂexible. ¯ πt = ρ¯ π ¯ πt−1 + η¯ π
t represents the monetary
authority’s inﬂation objective, which is assumed to follow a serially correlated process, with
mean zero and ηr
t is a serially uncorrelated shock to the interest rate.
The particular form of the monetary policy rule—including a reaction to changes in both
inﬂation and the output gap—reﬂects empirical considerations. The time-varying inﬂation
objective is meant to capture the disinﬂation process in the run up to the formation of the
European Monetary Union in 1999.
2.4 Market Clearing
The labour market is in equilibrium when the demand for the index of labour services by the
intermediate-goods ﬁrms equals the diﬀerentiated labour services supplied by households
at the wage rates set by unions. Similarly, the market for physical capital is in equilibrium
when the demand for capital services by the intermediate-goods ﬁrms equals the capital
10More speciﬁcally, we deﬁne the deviation of the ﬁscal variables from their respective steady-state values in
relative terms as a percentage of steady-state output; that is, tt =( Tt/Pt−T/P)/Y, bt =( Bt/Pt−1−B/P)/Y
and gt =( Gt − G)/Y.
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bonds is in equilibrium when the outstanding government bonds are held by households at
the market interest rate. Lastly, the ﬁnal-good market is in equilibrium when the supply
by the ﬁnal-good ﬁrms equals the demand by households and government:
Yt = Ct + It + Gt +Ψ ( Zt)Kt, (38)
where the last term accounts for the resource cost of varying the intensity of capital utili-
sation.
3 Bayesian Estimation of the Model
We adopt the empirical approach outlined in SW (2003) and estimate our augmented DSGE
model with non-Ricardian households employing Bayesian inference methods. This involves
obtaining the posterior distribution of the parameters of the model based on its log-linear
state-space representation and assessing its empirical performance in terms of its marginal
likelihood. In the following we brieﬂy sketch the adopted approach and describe the data
and the prior distributions used in its implementation. We then present our estimation
results.
3.1 Methodology
Employing Bayesian inference methods allows formalising the use of prior information ob-
tained from earlier studies at both the micro and macro level in estimating the parameters
of a possibly complex DSGE model.11 This seems particularly appealing in situations where
the sample period of the data is relatively short, as is the case for the euro area. From a
practical perspective, Bayesian inference may also help to alleviate the inherent numerical
diﬃculties associated with solving the highly non-linear estimation problem.
Formally, let p(θ|m) denote the prior distribution of the parameter vector θ ∈ Θ for some
model m ∈M ,a n dl e tL(YT|θ,m) denote the likelihood function for the observed data,
YT = {yt }T
t=1, conditional on parameter vector θ and model m. The posterior distribution
11For recent examples of Bayesian estimation of DSGE models see Adolfson, Las´ een, Lind´ e and Villani
(2004), Juillard, Karam, Laxton and Pesenti (2005), and Schorfheide and Lubik (2005).
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for YT and the prior distribution of θ,
p(θ|YT,m) ∝L (YT|θ,m)p(θ|m),
where “∝” indicates proportionality.
This distribution is typically characterised by standard measures of central location,
such as the mode or the mean, measures of dispersion, such as the standard deviation, or
selected percentiles.12
As discussed in Geweke (1999), Bayesian inference also provides a framework for compar-
ing non-nested and potentially misspeciﬁed models on the basis of their marginal likelihood.





Thus, the marginal likelihood gives an indication of the overall likelihood of a model con-
ditional on the observed data.
3.2 Data and Prior Distributions
Since we wish to use the SW model as our benchmark for assessing the performance of
the augmented DSGE model with non-Ricardian households, we follow SW (2003) in our
implementation of the Bayesian estimation methodology as closely as possible. Thus, as
in SW, we estimate the augmented model using aggregate euro area data on real GDP,
consumption, investment, employment, wage income, GDP inﬂation and the short-term
nominal interest rate. The data cover the period 1980Q1 through 1999Q4. Real variables
are expressed in logarithms and then detrended by removing individual linear trends, while
inﬂation and the interest rate are detrended under the assumption that these variables share
a common linear trend reﬂecting the protracted disinﬂation process prior to the formation of
12As in SW (2003), and following Schorfheide (2000), we adopt a Monte-Carlo Markov-Chain (MCMC)
sampling method to determine the posterior distribution of the parameter vector θ. More speciﬁcally, we rely
on the Metropolis-Hastings (MH) algorithm to obtain a large number of random draws from the posterior
distribution of θ. The mode and the Hessian of the posterior distribution, the latter evaluated at the mode,
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t), three serially uncorrelated cost-push shocks aﬀecting price





t), a serially correlated
government spending shock (gt), and two monetary policy shocks (ηr
t and ¯ πt) capturing
unexpected moves in the short-term nominal interest rate and persistent changes in the
monetary authority’s unobserved inﬂation objective, respectively. Although we will focus
on the consequences of only a subset of these shocks in the subsequent analysis, the inclusion
of a comprehensive set of shocks is important in order to match the time-series properties
of the data satisfactorily.
Regarding the choice of prior distributions for the parameters of the model, we follow
SW (2003) in ﬁxing several parameters throughout the estimation. This includes setting
the subjective discount factor β to 0.99, the production function parameter α to 0.3, the
depreciation rate δ to 0.025 and the steady-state wage markup λw to 0.5. The steady-state
ratios of government spending and government debt over GDP, G/Y and (B/P)/Y,a r es e t
equal to 0.18 and 0.6×4, respectively. Most of these parameters are related to the steady-
state values of observed variables in an obvious way. In contrast to SW, we assume that the
steady-state price markup λp is equal to the share of the ﬁxed costs in production, Φ/Y,
implying zero proﬁts in steady state. For versions of the model incorporating distortionary
taxation, we set the income tax rate τd, the pay-roll tax rate τw and the consumption tax
rate τc equal to 0.14, 0.45 and 0.20, respectively.14
We also follow SW (2003) in choosing the same prior distributions for the parameters
that need to be estimated and that are common to the benchmark model and our aug-
mented speciﬁcation. A complete listing of the details on the prior distributions, including
their means and standard deviations, can be found in Appendix Table A. Here, we only
wish to mention that the preference, technology, and price and wage-setting parameters
13As in SW, we use the period 1970Q1 to 1979Q4 to obtain good initial values of the unobserved variables
in the model’s linear state-space representation and then use the period 1980Q1 to 1999Q4 to compute the
likelihood with the Kalman ﬁlter.
14The calibration of tax rates is based on the time series of government revenues contained in the data
set provided by Fagan, Henry and Mestre (2001). Lacking a more detailed break down of tax categories, we
use indirect taxes minus subsidies as our proxy for consumption taxes. The results documented below are
robust to reasonable variations in the steady-state tax rates.
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straining individual parameters to fall in the range of zero to one, if prescribed by theory.
The parameters controlling the persistence of the shock processes are assumed to have a
Beta distribution with uniform mean 0.85 and uniform standard deviation 0.1. The latter
assumption facilitates the identiﬁcation of persistent as opposed to non-persistent shocks.
The conditional standard deviations of the shock processes are assumed to have an Inverted
Gamma distribution with two degrees of freedom. This distribution guarantees a positive
standard deviation with a relatively large support. Finally, the parameters of the monetary
policy rule are assumed to follow a Normal distribution, except for the coeﬃcient on the
lagged nominal interest rate which is assumed to follow a Beta distribution.
The prior distributions which remain to be speciﬁed are those for the share of non-
Ricardian households, ω, and the parameters of the ﬁscal policy rule, φb and φg. In line with
the baseline calibrations used in Gal´ ı et al. (2004), we assume that ω has a Beta distribution
with mean 0.5 and standard deviation 0.1. This value is consistent with estimates obtained
by Campbell and Mankiw (1989) for the fraction of liquidity-constrained households in the
United States for the pre-1990 period. The ﬁscal policy parameter prescribing the response
of lump-sum taxes to debt, φb, is assumed to follow an Inverted Gamma distribution with
mean 0.1 and degrees of freedom equal to 2.15 Finally, the parameter governing the response
of lump-sum taxes to government spending is assumed to have a Normal distribution with
mean 0.1 and standard deviation 0.05.
3.3 Estimation Results
Table 1 reports the means of the posterior distributions for a subset of parameters that
are a priori considered to be of particular relevance in accounting for possible diﬀerences
between the benchmark speciﬁcation of SW (2003) and our augmented speciﬁcation with
non-Ricardian households.16 In total, we report estimation results for four diﬀerent speci-
ﬁcations, including the benchmark speciﬁcation of SW and three alternative speciﬁcations
15The choice of the Inverted Gamma distribution guarantees that the likelihood of obtaining estimates
that result in unstable debt dynamics is negligible.
16Further estimation results are reported in Appendix Table B. The 10% and 90% percentiles of the
posterior distributions are available from the authors on request.
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Speciﬁcations with Non-Ricardian Households
Benchmark Lump-Sum Asym. Lump- Lump-Sum &
Speciﬁcation Taxation Sum Taxation Distort. Taxation
(SW 2003) I II III
A. Parameters Inﬂuencing Consumption Choices
ω 0.246 0.249 0.370
ς 1.339 1.099 0.985 1.101
ϑ 0.597 0.411 0.412 0.412
ρb 0.820 0.840 0.847 0.825
σ(ηb
t) 0.414 0.373 0.346 0.386
B. Parameters Inﬂuencing Labour Supply and Wage Setting
ζ 2.168 2.660 2.638 2.343
ρn 0.889 0.917 0.904 0.894
σ(ηn
t ) 3.706 3.361 3.603 3.628
ξw 0.731 0.741 0.739 0.747
γw 0.711 0.712 0.731 0.724
σ(ηw
t ) 0.291 0.296 0.295 0.296
C. Fiscal Policy Parameters
φb 1.000∗ 0.074 1.000∗ 0.292
φg 0.000∗ 0.118 0.000∗ 0.123
ρg 0.943 0.947 0.952 0.944
σ(η
g
t) 0.323 0.320 0.318 0.319
D. Marginal Likelihood
ln L(YT|m) -286.10 -296.96 -295.24 -292.00
Note: For the alternative speciﬁcations with and without non-Ricardian households, this table reports
the posterior means of the parameters inﬂuencing the households’ consumption choices (Panel A), the
parameters aﬀecting labour supply and wage setting (Panel B) and the ﬁscal policy parameters (Panel C).
The posterior means are obtained through the Metropolis-Hastings sampling algorithm. The inclusion of
an asterisk indicates that a periodically balanced government budget has been assumed, since the Ricardian
households are indiﬀerent to the time path along which government debt evolves. The table also indictes
the marginal likelihood for the alternative speciﬁcations (Panel D). Notice that the marginal likelihood for
the speciﬁcation with distortionary taxes but without non-Ricardian households equals 288.23.
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in place.17 In the ﬁrst two out of these three alternative speciﬁcations, we only consider
lump-sum taxation; that is, we set the distortionary tax rates equal to zero. Speciﬁcation I
assumes that both Ricardian and non-Ricardian households pay lump-sum taxes in equal
proportions, while speciﬁcation II assumes that the levied lump-sum taxes are unevenly
distributed across the two groups of households. Speciﬁcally, we consider the extreme case
where non-Ricardian households are completely exempted from paying taxes to exemplify
the diﬀerences in household behaviour. Speciﬁcation III extends speciﬁcation I by also in-
corporating distortionary taxes: an income tax levied on all sources of income (except for
returns on bonds), a pay-roll tax on wage income and a tax on consumption. To the extent
that these speciﬁcations aﬀect the income at the disposal of non-Ricardian households in
diﬀerent ways, they are a priori expected to have quite diﬀerent implications for the role of
non-Ricardian households in the propagation of shocks.
Panel A of Table 1 indicates the posterior means of the parameters directly inﬂuencing
the consumption choices of Ricardian and non-Ricardian households, including the share
of non-Ricardian households, ω, the preference parameters ς and ϑ, and the parameters
governing the process of the intertemporal preference shock, ρb and σ(ηb
t). Here, σ(·)
generically indicates the (conditional) standard deviation of a shock. Starting with the pos-
terior mean of ω, we observe that the estimated share of non-Ricardian households is quite
a bit smaller than the mean of the prior distribution which was set equal 0.5 on the basis
of estimates obtained for the pre-1990 period in the United States (see, e.g., Campbell and
Mankiw, 1989). Speciﬁcally, the posterior mean of the share of non-Ricardian households
equals one-fourth or roughly one-third, depending on the presence of distortionary taxes.
A possible interpretation of this ﬁnding is that our sample only covers observations from
the period 1980 through 1999 which was a period of far-reaching ﬁnancial deregulation that
dramatically reduced ﬁnancial-market participation costs.18
17Small deviations of the estimates reported for the benchmark speciﬁcation from those reported in SW
may result from using a slightly extended sample, incorporating capital utilisation cost in the aggregate
resource constraint, small discrepancies in the calibration of the model’s steady state as well as diﬀerences
in the implementation of the Metropolis-Hastings sampling algorithm.
18This interpretation is consistent with the ﬁndings of Bilbiie and Straub (2004b) who show that the share
of non-Ricardian households in the United States fell signiﬁcantly after the Depository and Institutions
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on the parameters inﬂuencing the intertemporal consumption choices of Ricardian house-
holds. In particular, the estimated intertemporal elasticity of substitution, 1/ς, is quite
a bit larger than the estimate obtained for the benchmark speciﬁcation, implying a lower
willingness to smooth consumption on the part of Ricardian households. In fact, for the
speciﬁcations featuring non-Ricardian households the estimated intertemporal elasticity of
substitution is close to unity and consumption preferences are thus broadly consistent with
a logarithmic speciﬁcation. Similarly, the estimated degree of habit formation ϑ is signiﬁ-
cantly smaller than the estimate obtained for the benchmark speciﬁcation. Consequently,
changes in the short-term interest rate ought to have a comparatively large impact on the
consumption choices of Ricardian households.
Panel B of Table 1 reports the posterior means of the parameters aﬀecting labour supply
and unionised wage setting. The estimate of the inverse elasticity of labour supply with
respect to the real wage, ζ, turns out to be somewhat higher in the speciﬁcations with
non-Ricardian households. However, variations in the labour-supply elasticity of this order
of magnitude have little consequence for the dynamics of the type of model examined
in this paper. Similarly, we observe some variation in the estimates of the parameters
characterising the labour-supply shock, ρn and σ(ηn
t ), although these estimates tend to
move in opposite directions, leaving the unconditional variation of the labour-supply shocks
across speciﬁcations broadly unchanged. Finally, the posterior means of the parameters
inﬂuencing the unions’ wage-setting decisions, ξw, γw and σ(ηw
t ), are virtually unaﬀected
by the inclusion of non-Ricardian households.
Panel C shows the posterior means of the ﬁscal policy parameters. Of course, in the
benchmark speciﬁcation without non-Ricardian households, but also in the speciﬁcation
where non-Ricardian households are assumed to be exempted from paying taxes, the par-
ticular time path along which government debt evolves does not matter and, thus, we have
imposed a periodically balanced government budget with φb = 1 and φg = 0. For the two
remaining speciﬁcations, we observe quite some heterogeneity regarding the responsiveness
of lump-sum taxes to government debt, φb, with the posterior mean being equal to 0.07
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA) had passed legislation in 1980.
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ernment spending that is instantaneously ﬁnanced by lump-sum taxes, φg, has a mean of
about 0.12, irrespective of the presence of distortionary taxes. Not surprisingly, the param-
eters of the exogenous shock process characterising government spending, ρg and σ(η
g
t), are
very similar across all four speciﬁcations. Importantly, the estimated degree of persistence
is close to 0.95 and, hence, government spending shocks ought to induce a large negative
wealth eﬀect in the model.
Finally, Panel D indicates the marginal likelihood for the four speciﬁcations which al-
lows to assess their relative performance conditional on the data. Surprisingly, none of
the augmented speciﬁcations with non-Ricardian households succeeds in outperforming the
benchmark model. Obviously, there may be various reasons for this relatively poor em-
pirical performance of the augmented model. For example, the presence of non-Ricardian
households, while tilting the operating characteristics of the model in response to govern-
ment spending shocks in the desired direction, may adversely aﬀect the response pattern
of the model to alternative shocks, possibly originating in the inﬂuence that the inclusion
of non-Ricardian households exerts on the estimated preference parameters. Alternatively,
the quantitative importance of government spending shocks may possibly be overstated
when evaluated through the lens of a New-Keynesian model allowing for non-Ricardian
elements. In the subsequent analysis we will therefore systematically examine the role of
non-Ricardian households for the equilibrium dynamics of the model.
4 Assessing the Role of Non-Ricardian Households
Having estimated alternative speciﬁcations of the augmented DSGE model of the euro
area, we now proceed to investigate the role played by non-Ricardian households in the
propagation of shocks and in accounting for observed ﬂuctuations in consumption to enhance
our understanding of the relatively poor empirical performance of the speciﬁcations with
non-Ricardian households. In this context, we focus our analysis on the eﬀects of government
spending and monetary policy shocks, but also review the consequences of a number of
other shocks that have been identiﬁed in the previous section as potentially important for
explaining the inﬂuences of non-Ricardian households on consumption dynamics.
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For each of the four estimated speciﬁcations, Figure 1 depicts the dynamic responses of
selected variables to a persistent government spending shock equal to one percent of steady-
state output. For ease of comparison, the parameter governing the degree of persistence is
set equal to the posterior mean of ρg =0 .943 that has been obtained for the benchmark
speciﬁcation without non-Ricardian households. All dynamic responses are depicted as
percentage-point deviations from steady state.
As can be seen in the upper left panel in Figure 1, aggregate consumption in the bench-
mark speciﬁcation without non-Ricardian households (referred to as benchmark and in-
dicated by a solid line) falls noticeably on impact in response to a government spending
shock before gradually returning to steady state, with the adjustment path exhibiting a
hump-shaped pattern. Apparently, for the augmented speciﬁcations I to III featuring non-
Ricardian households aggregate consumption falls by less when compared to the consump-
tion response in the benchmark speciﬁcation. Yet again, in all three speciﬁcations with
non-Ricardian households government spending shocks fail to crowd in aggregate consump-
tion and thereby do not generate a ﬁscal multiplier with respect to output that exceeds one.
Even worse, the stronger impact eﬀect of government spending shocks is very short-lived and
eventually followed by a lasting period of pronounced under-shooting of the consumption
path obtained in the benchmark speciﬁcation.
Comparing the consumption patterns of Ricardian and non-Ricardian households helps
to understand the diﬀerences in the dynamic response pattern of aggregate consumption
across speciﬁcations. As shown in the middle right panel of Figure 1, the government
spending shock succeeds, at least on impact, in stimulating consumption on the part of
non-Ricardian households, regardless of the tax scheme in place. For the speciﬁcation with
evenly distributed lump-sum taxes (speciﬁcation I, dashed line), for example, consumption
increases on impact by about 0.5 percentage points. However, consumption starts falling
below its steady-state level already after a few quarters, because the build up of govern-
ment debt leads to a rise in lump-sum taxes which in turn lowers after-tax disposable income
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Note: For the alternative speciﬁcations with and without non-Ricardian households (see Table 1 for details),
this ﬁgure depicts the dynamic responses of selected variables to a persistent government spending shock
equal to 1 percent of steady-state output. The parameter governing the degree of persistence is set equal
to the estimate for the benchmark speciﬁcation with ρg =0 .943. All dynamic responses are depicted as
percentage-point deviations from steady state.
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paying lump-sum taxes (speciﬁcation II, dashed-dotted line), we observe that the impact
multiplier is considerably larger and, importantly, that consumption never falls below its
steady-state level in the course of the adjustment process. By contrast, for the speciﬁca-
tion which, in addition, incorporates distortionary taxes (speciﬁcation III, dotted line) the
impact multiplier is cut in half when compared with the speciﬁcation that features lump-
sum taxation alone. In this case, after-tax disposable income is reduced even more due to
the households’ income and pay-roll tax obligations. Above and beyond, consumption is
retrenched by the existence of the consumption tax.
As regards the consumption proﬁle of Ricardian households, it can be seen in the middle
left panel of Figure 1 that consumption falls on impact even further than in the bench-
mark speciﬁcation, with the return to steady state eventually somewhat faster though.
Thus, while an increase in government spending positively aﬀects consumption spending
of non-Ricardian households, at least on impact, this eﬀect tends to be oﬀset by a fall in
consumption on the part of Ricardian households. Clearly, with the estimated share of
non-Ricardian households being relatively small, the overall eﬀect of government spending
shocks on aggregate consumption turns out to be negative.
The lower two panels in Figure 1 depict the responses of hours worked and the real
wage. On impact, hours worked increase substantially, reﬂecting the surge in labour demand
following the government spending shock. In contrast, while moving in the desired direction,
the real wage rises by only very little due to the high degree of rigidity characterising wage-
setting decisions. This feature of our estimated model contrasts with the much simpler
calibrated set up in Gal´ ı et al. (2004). The latter abstracts from inertia in the wage-
setting process and incorporates a static labour demand schedule instead according to which
households are willing to meet ﬁrms’ demand for labour at the real wage oﬀered. This
static set up implies, quite mechanistically, a sharp rise in the real wage in response to a
government spending shock, which in turn boosts disposable income and helps to crowd in
aggregate consumption, at least on impact.19
19For a critical discussion of the labour demand schedule proposed by Gal´ ı et al. (2004) and its importance
for generating a crowding-in eﬀect see also Mihov (2003).
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Note: For the alternative speciﬁcations with and without non-Ricardian households, (see Table 1 for
details), this ﬁgure depicts the dynamic responses of selected variables to a persistent government spending
shock equal to 1 percent of steady-state output. The parameter governing the degree of persistence is set
equal to the estimate for the benchmark speciﬁcation with ρg =0 .943. All dynamic responses are depicted
as percentage-point deviations from steady state.
To cast further light on the consequences of a government spending shock in our esti-
mated model, Figure 2 portrays the dynamic responses of monetary policy, as captured by
the short-term nominal interest rate, together with the responses of those variables most
inﬂuential for the monetary authority’s rule-based interest-rate decision. As can be seen
in the upper right panel of the ﬁgure, in the speciﬁcations with non-Ricardian households
the size of the output gap building up in response to a government spending shock exceeds
that in the benchmark speciﬁcation by almost one-tenth of a percentage point, with the
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the lower left panel shows that the inﬂation eﬀect is fairly small and roughly comparable
across speciﬁcations. As demonstrated in the lower right panel, this reﬂects that the time
proﬁle of real marginal cost—the key driver of inﬂation—is largely similar. Ultimately, as
shown in the upper left panel, the more sizeable response of the output gap dominates and
thus results in a more pronounced tightening of monetary policy in the speciﬁcations with
non-Ricardian households. Consistent with the response pattern exposed in Figure 1 above,
this exacerbates the decline in consumption spending on the part of Ricardian households,
thereby further curbing the impact of a government spending shock.
Finally, Figure 3 depicts the consequences of a monetary policy shock corresponding
to an unexpected one-quarter increase in the short-term nominal interest rate equal to 25
basis points, with the monetary authority following the estimated policy rule thereafter. As
shown in the upper left panel of the ﬁgure, a rise in the short-term nominal interest rate
has a comparatively large negative impact on aggregate consumption in the speciﬁcations
with non-Ricardian households. As can be seen in the middle left panel, this echoes, at
least in the initial periods, a disproportionate fall in consumption on the part of Ricardian
households. As we emphasised in our discussion of the estimation results, the latter reﬂects
that the estimates of both the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and the
degree of habit formation are quite a bit smaller in the speciﬁcations with non-Ricardian
households. As a consequence, the interest-rate elasticity of consumption is higher, yielding
a stronger decline in consumption after a monetary policy shock. However, regarding the
overall eﬀect on output, we observe that the stronger decline in aggregate consumption is
at least partially oﬀset by a more subdued fall in investment. We also observe that the
decrease in hours worked and the real wage is uniformly smaller.
4.2 Forecast-Error-Variance Decomposition
To provide additional insights into the various mechanisms through which non-Ricardian
households may inﬂuence the dynamic consumption responses in our model, we analyse
the contributions of selected shocks to the forecast-error variance of aggregate consump-
tion and its sub-components at various horizons. The results of the forecast-error-variance
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Note: For the alternative speciﬁcations with and without non-Ricardian households, (see Table 1 for
details), this ﬁgure depicts the dynamic responses of selected variables to a monetary policy shock corre-
sponding to an unexpected one-quarter increase in the short-term nominal interest rate equal to 25 basis
points, whith the monetary authority following the estimated policy rule thereafter. All dynamic responses
are reported as percentage-point deviations from steady state.
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iﬁcation with those for the augmented speciﬁcation featuring non-Ricardian households
and uniformly distributed lump-sum taxes. We focus on those shocks that have already
been identiﬁed above as primarily important for discerning the inﬂuences of non-Ricardian
households, namely the government spending shock, the intertemporal preference shock,
the labour supply shock and the wage markup shock. In addition, we also report results for
the monetary policy shock.
By comparing the results for the benchmark speciﬁcation in Panel A of Table 2 with
those for the speciﬁcation with non-Ricardian households in Panel B, it can be seen that the
contributions of the selected shocks to the forecast-error variance of aggregate consumption
are broadly similar across the two speciﬁcations. Nevertheless, while diﬀerences in the
contributions of government spending shocks are hardly discernible at longer horizons, the
contributions of government spending shocks are found to be noticeably smaller at shorter
horizons in the speciﬁcation with non-Ricardian households. This is consistent with a more
limited crowding-out eﬀect on impact due to the presence of non-Ricardian households
(see Figure 1 above). Another noteworthy discrepancy is exhibited by the contributions
of wage markup shocks. The latter are found to have a positive, albeit small short-run
eﬀect on aggregate consumption in the speciﬁcation with non-Ricardian households, which
is virtually zero in the benchmark speciﬁcation.
Contrasting the results obtained for the sub-components of aggregate consumption, as
shown in the lower part of Panel B in Table 2, reveals a number of notable diﬀerences that
are conducive to a better understanding of the aggregate results. First, in the short run,
government spending shocks account for about 3 percent of the ﬂuctuations in consumption
of non-Ricardian households, while they account for only half a percent in the case of Ricar-
dian households. Second, since preference shocks do not directly inﬂuence the consumption
decision of non-Ricardian households, they explain, regardless of the forecast horizon, only
about 15 percent of the variation in non-Ricardian households’ consumption, compared to
roughly 60 percent for Ricardian households. Similarly, for non-Ricardian households the
contribution of labour supply shocks is signiﬁcantly smaller than for Ricardian households.
On the contrary, wage markup shocks, which directly aﬀect the after-tax disposable income
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August 2005Table 2: Forecast-Error-Variance Decomposition of Consumption (in Percent)
Selected Shocks of the Estimated DSGE Model
Forecast Government Intertemp. Labor Wage Monetary








A. Consumption in the Benchmark Speciﬁcation
1 0.5 69.7 12.1 0.1 11.8
4 0.7 64.2 14.8 0.0 12.7
10 0.9 59.1 16.7 0.0 13.5
100 1.3 54.5 18.1 0.1 14.0
B. Consumption in Speciﬁcation I with Lump-Sum Taxation
Aggregate Consumption
1 0.1 68.4 14.0 1.7 12.8
4 0.3 62.5 16.2 0.9 14.3
10 0.6 57.0 18.3 0.7 15.9
100 1.5 51.1 20.9 0.6 17.1
Consumption: Ricardian Households
1 0.5 65.7 13.4 0.0 10.5
4 0.6 61.3 15.4 0.0 10.6
10 0.7 57.5 16.9 0.0 10.5
100 0.9 53.5 18.9 0.1 10.6
Consumption: Non-Ricardian Households
1 3.0 14.7 3.1 27.5 7.0
4 1.6 18.7 6.3 22.3 18.7
10 1.7 14.5 8.8 16.0 30.6
100 7.6 10.1 11.6 10.6 34.1
Note: This table reports selected results of a forecast-error-variance decomposition of consumption for the
benchmark speciﬁcation of the estimated DSGE model (Panel A) and for the augmented speciﬁcation with
non-Ricardian households and uniformly distributed lump-sum taxes (Panel B).
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tions. All in all, the fact that the estimated share of non-Ricardian households amounts
to less than one-fourth may then explain why only fairly small eﬀects can be observed at
the aggregate level. Furthermore, the eﬀects of shocks that inﬂuence Ricardian and non-
Ricardian households in opposite ways, such as the government spending shock, may at
least partially cancel out each other.
5 Sensitivity Analysis
We ﬁnally present some additional sensitivity analysis to shed light on the general ability
of our estimated model to generate crowding-in eﬀects with regard to consumption or even
an overall ﬁscal multiplier larger than one in response to a government spending shock. To
this end, we appraise the impact eﬀect of a government spending shock on consumption
(aggregated and dis-aggregated) and investment that results when a single parameter is
varied holding all other parameters constant at their estimated values. Clearly, if the
parameters can vary over a relatively broad range of values without resulting in a large
increase in consumption on impact, there may be no realistic chance to generate an overall
ﬁscal multiplier that exceeds one within the framework of our estimated model.
Figure 4 depicts the sensitivity of the impact multiplier of a government spending
shock for the speciﬁcation with non-Ricardian households and uniformly distributed lump-
sum taxes. We focus on those parameters that are most likely to have a positive inﬂuence
on the size of the consumption response, notably the share of non-Ricardian households, ω,
the ﬁscal policy parameters, ρg, φb and φg, and the parameters inﬂuencing unionised wage-
setting decisions, ξw and γw. Each panel of the ﬁgure shows the percentage-point deviation
from steady state for aggregate consumption, consumption on the part of both Ricardian
and non-Ricardian households and aggregate investment as a single parameter is varied,
with the estimated mean of the parameter indicated by a solid vertical line.
The upper left panel in Figure 4 depicts the sensitivity of the impact multiplier to vari-
ations in the share of non-Ricardian households, ω. Once the value of ω exceeds 0.35, the
response of aggregate consumption to a government spending shock turns out to be positive,
with the response of investment remaining broadly unchanged. In contrast, as shown in the
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August 2005Figure 4: The Sensitivity of the Impact Multiplier to Variations in Selected Parameters
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Note: This ﬁgure depicts the sensitivity of the impact response of consumption and investment to gov-
ernment spending shocks for the speciﬁcation with non-Ricardian households and uniformly distributed
lump-sum taxes. The sensitivity is assessed by varying a single parameter holding all other parameters
constant at their estimated values.
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need to fall below 0.87 in order to succeed in generating a positive response of aggregate
consumption. The reason is that, with an estimated share of non-Ricardian households of
about one-quarter, the negative wealth eﬀect induced by a government spending shock ex-
hibiting the estimated degree of persistence weighs too heavily on the Ricardian households.
It also crowds out investment by a signiﬁcant amount.
The two panels in the middle of Figure 4 portray the consequences of variations in the
parameters of the ﬁscal policy rule. Interestingly, and in contrast to the ﬁndings presented
in Gal´ ı et al. (2004), varying the responsiveness of lump-sum taxes to government debt,
φb, has almost no eﬀect on the instantaneous consumption response. This reﬂects that
government debt is a predetermined variable which only gradually builds up over time,
leaving disposable income and thus consumption on the part of non-Ricardian households
largely unaﬀected on impact. In contrast, lowering the share of government spending that is
instantaneously ﬁnanced by lump-sum taxes, as captured by parameter φg, tends to bolster
disposable income and thus consumption. However, even lowering φg to zero does not result
in a positive impact eﬀect.
Finally, the two lower panels in Figure 4 depict the consequences of varying the parame-
ters that govern unionised wage setting. Both the frequency of receiving permission to reset
wages, 1 − ξw, and the degree of wage indexation, γw, are found to have negligible eﬀects
on the impact responses of consumption and investment. Obviously, variations in these
parameters are not conducive to generating a positive impact multiplier either, at least for
plausible values of the parameters concerned.20 The reason is that the real wage and, thus,
the disposable income of non-Ricardian households rise by only very little if nominal wages
are relatively sticky.
Overall, our sensitivity analysis reveals that there is only a fairly small chance that
government spending shocks do crowd in consumption or do even generate an overall ﬁscal
multiplier larger than one within the framework of our estimated DSGE model of the euro
area. Indeed, the actual parameter estimates all fall in regions that are largely incompat-
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Notwithstanding these ﬁndings, the analysis suggests that the inclusion of non-Ricardian
households does tilt the consumption response to government spending shocks in the desired
direction. At the same time, the negative wealth eﬀect induced by government shocks still
weighs too heavily on Ricardian households. This points to a need to modify the model in
directions which help to further mitigate the induced negative wealth eﬀect.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have undertaken an attempt to reconcile the existing evidence on the
eﬀects of government spending shocks with the predictions of a New-Keynesian DSGE
model that builds on explicit microfoundations with optimising agents. To account for the
limited ability of households to smooth consumption over time we have modiﬁed the model
by allowing for the co-existence of non-Ricardian and Ricardian households. Employing
Bayesian inference methods to estimate this model for the euro area over the period 1980
through 1999, we ﬁnd that the estimated share of non-Ricardian households in the euro
area is relatively small, tentatively suggesting that ﬁnancial deregulation over the last two
decades has lowered ﬁnancial-market participation costs. At the same time, we show that
the presence of non-Ricardian households is in general conducive to raising the level of
consumption in response to government spending shocks when compared with a benchmark
speciﬁcation of the model without non-Ricardian households. However, there is only a
fairly small chance that government spending shocks do actually crowd in consumption.
The main reason is that the estimated share of non-Ricardian households is relatively low.
In order to predict crowding-in eﬀects, the model would need to be modiﬁed in directions
which help to further mitigate the negative wealth eﬀect induced by the highly persistent
nature of government spending shocks.
While our model allows for a relatively detailed ﬁscal policy set up with diﬀerent types
of taxes that determine government revenues and a ﬁscal policy rule that stabilises gov-
ernment debt, this paper has proceeded under the simplifying assumption that government
spending evolves exogenously according to a highly persistent shock process. In subsequent
work it will be interesting to explore the consequences when agents have limited information
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tions about the nature of unobserved shocks. As shown in Erceg, Guerrieri and Gust (2003),
such mechanism may help to reduce the negative wealth eﬀect induced by highly persis-
tent government spending shocks. Similarly, the induced negative wealth eﬀect is likely to
be mitigated once the possibility of an endogenous response of the long-run government
debt-to-GDP ratio to persistent government spending shocks is taken into account. These
extensions may ultimately lessen the need to include non-Ricardian elements; but, at the
same time, they may help to improve the empirical performance of the model. Finally, in
the light of empirical evidence that distortionary taxes tend to rise in response to lasting
increases in government spending (see, e.g., Fat´ as and Mihov, 2001; and Burnside, Eichen-
baum and Fisher, 2003), it would also be interesting to extend the analysis by allowing for
alternative ﬁscal policy rules with distortionary rather than lump-sum taxes responding to
developments in government spending and debt.
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A. Parameters Inﬂuencing Consumption Choices
ω Beta 0.50 0.10
ς Normal 1.00 0.375
ϑ Beta 0.70 0.10
ρb Beta 0.85 0.10
σ(ηb
t) Inverse Gamma 0.20 2
B. Parameters Inﬂuencing Labour Supply and Wage Setting
ζ Normal 2.00 0.75
ρn Beta 0.85 0.10
σ(ηn
t ) Inverse Gamma 1.00 2
ξw Beta 0.75 0.05
γw Beta 0.75 0.15
σ(ηw
t ) Inverse Gamma 0.25 2
C. Parameters Characterising Technology
ϕ Normal 0.45 0.25
υ Normal 4.00 1.50
ψ Normal 0.20 0.075
ρa Beta 0.85 0.10
σ(ηa
t ) Inverse Gamma 0.40 2
ρi Beta 0.85 0.10
σ(ηi
t) Inverse Gamma 0.10 2
σ(η
q
t) Inverse Gamma 0.40 2
D. Parameters Inﬂuencing Price Setting
ξp Beta 0.75 0.05
γp Beta 0.75 0.15
σ(η
p
t) Inverse Gamma 0.15 2
Note: For each of the estimated parameters of the augmented DSGE model of the euro area, this table
reports the type of prior distribution, its mean and its standard deviation. For the Inverted Gamma
distribution, the degrees of freedom, rather than the standard deviation, are indicated.
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E. Fiscal Policy Parameters
φb Inverse Gamma 0.10 2
φg Normal 0.10 0.05
ρg Beta 0.85 0.10
σ(η
g
t) Inverse Gamma 0.30 2
F. Monetary Policy Rule Parameters
φr Beta 0.80 0.10
φπ Normal 1.70 0.10
φy Normal 0.125 0.05
φ∆π Normal 0.30 0.10
φ∆y Normal 0.0625 0.05
σ(ηr
t) Inverse Gamma 0.10 2
ρ¯ π Beta 0.85 0.10
σ(η¯ π
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August 2005Table B: Further Estimation Results for the Augmented DSGE Model of the Euro Area
Speciﬁcations with Non-Ricardian Households
Benchmark Lump-Sum Asym. Lump- Lump-Sum &
Speciﬁcation Taxation Sum Taxation Distort. Taxation
(SW 2003) I II III
A. Parameters Characterising Technology
ϕ 0.418 0.662 0.629 0.602
υ 7.293 7.302 7.204 7.386
ψ 0.216 0.215 0.225 0.219
ρa 0.794 0.875 0.872 0.849
σ(ηa
t ) 0.658 0.521 0.526 0.547
ρi 0.921 0.905 0.923 0.923
σ(ηi
t) 0.107 0.153 0.108 0.097
σ(η
q
t) 0.629 0.632 0.626 0.636
B. Parameters Inﬂuencing Price Setting
ξp 0.911 0.920 0.918 0.914
γp 0.452 0.471 0.460 0.456
σ(η
p
t) 0.161 0.165 0.161 0.165
C. Monetary Policy Rule Parameters
φr 0.969 0.961 0.967 0.964
φπ 1.700 1.684 1.671 1.692
φy 0.106 0.103 0.116 0.103
φ∆π 0.129 0.187 0.171 0.160
φ∆y 0.158 0.156 0.158 0.153
σ(ηr
t) 0.081 0.098 0.089 0.088
ρ¯ π 0.870 0.840 0.861 0.828
σ(η¯ π
t ) 0.013 0.012 0.020 0.014
Note: This table reports the posterior means of the parameters characterising technology (Panel A), the
parameters aﬀecting ﬁrms’ price-setting behaviour (Panel B) and the monetary policy rule parameters
(Panel C). The posterior means are obtained through the Metropolis-Hastings sampling algorithm. The
parameter ϕ denotes the share of ﬁxed cost in production, and the parameters υ and ψ characterise the
adjustment cost functions Υ(·)a n dΨ (·), respectively.
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